Environmental Policy, International Agreements, and International Trade
The individual chapters fall into four Parts, which attempt to answer the following questions:
1. How can international environmental agreements be designed to increase the number of countries that might join such agreements?
2. If it is possible to reach an environmental agreement among only a small number of countries, how should environmental policies by the parties to the agreement be designed to reduce the extent to which reductions in pollution by the signatories are offset by increases in emissions by non-signatory countries?
3. When a country increases the stringency of its environmental policies, are the impacts on trade and welfare larger when account is taken of scale economies and imperfect competition in international markets than was thought to be the case from earlier studies based on the assumption of competitive markets for international trade?
4. Do national governments have incentives to distort their environmental policies to gain strategic advantage, and if so, what form might this take and what does this imply about the sovereignty of nations in choosing environmental policies?
Employing both theoretical analysis and empirical modelling, 'Environmental Policy, International Agreements, and International Trade' aims to advance understanding of some of the key issues surrounding the links between trade and the environment. It will appeal to all those with an interest in environmental issues and international trade.
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